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The Companies Act 2008 1  (“the Act”) has had a long and arduous path to come into 
existence. It started with the Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform published in Notice 1183 
in Government Gazette 26493 of 2004-06-23, ironically marked “Confidential”. After various 
draft bills, the Act was signed by the President on 08th April 2009 but only to came into 
operation on the date determined by proclamation, and from the general effective date then 
repealed most of the Companies Act  of 19732 (“1973 Act”).3   
 
The Act4 started a new era in South African corporate law and extensively changed the 
existing law, and the common law. It appears that the Act follows an eclectic approach in that 
it borrowed extensively from the corporate laws of other countries. This is not per se an 
unacceptable modus operandi, but rather the careful grafting into the existing common law 
was necessary, so as not to create problems and uncertainty.5 A situation where this may be 
the case, and where the confusion may be exacerbated, is in respect of company capacity and 
representation. Capacity and representation of a company are some of the most important 
principles of company law as this is the interface with the outside world, and certainty for the 
company and third parties should be a given. However, in practice this has never been the 
case and the concepts have been confused with one another and on their own by the courts, 
academics and students. The confusion was not because of anything else but the 
extraordinary complexity of these concepts if one were to stray from the most basic 
principles.6 
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The Companies Act 20087 brought in many changes to the way in which the conduct of 
business will be regulated in South Africa. One of the aspects which have been the subject of 
much comment and debate is the way in which a company will regulate its internal affairs 
and procedures through the introduction of the Memorandum of Incorporation (MOI), which 
document will replace the Memorandum and Articles of Association8 (Memorandum and 
Articles) under the Companies Act, 19739.  
The Memorandum of Incorporation and Articles of Association has the function of, among 
other things, regulating the authority individuals within a company have to bind that company 
when contracting on its behalf with third parties. In terms of the New Act10, it will become 
mandatory for all companies conducting business in terms of its Memorandum and Articles 
to adopt a MOI to replace the existing Memorandum and Articles. While the function of the 
Memorandum of Incorporation mirrors that of the Memorandum of Incorporation and 
Articles of Association, there are significant changes regarding the way in which this 
document is constructed and interpreted.11 Of particular interest to companies, and something 
to keep in mind when conducting the exercise of converting the Memorandum of 
Incorporation and Articles of Association to a Memorandum of Incorporation, is the way in 
which certain clauses in the Memorandum of Incorporation will be treated in respect of third 
parties contracting with the company, and in particular how the Turquand Rule12 and the 
Doctrine of Constructive Notice, two well established principles under the current regime, 
have been changed.13 
Hence, an in depth analysis containing a re-statement of the law in respect of representation 
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1.1. The title 
“The Turquand rule, corporate capacity and agency in South Africa” 
1.2. The topic: 
The topic upon which the research will be conducted involves a company law aspect in which 
an in depth analysis of information relating to the Turquand Rule and its application in South 
Africa Further, an analysis of Corporate Capacity and Agency, the Doctrine of Constructive 
Notice and the ultra vires doctrine will be conducted.  
1.3. The research design, methodology and ethical framework: 
The research methodology for this paper is desk-based therefore, the research in respect of 
the Turquand Rule and corporate capacity and agency will be based on cases, common law 
and legislation analysis. Other literature such as journals, articles and textbooks will be 
considered as well. 
 
The way in which this research will be done will involve research in terms of the various 
databases which are made available. The following databases will be used during the midst of 
the research namely, Juta, Lexis Nexis, Hein online, SAFLII and Sabinet.  
 
The theoretical framework that will be adopted in the midst of this study is analytical doctrine 
research, also known as legal positivism. 
 
This theoretical frame deals with the law which is posited by human and the validity of such 
law lies in its formal legal status and not in relation to morality or any other external 




In relation to this, the broader theoretical perspectives hold that human knowledge is based 
upon that which can be experienced through the senses or through observation (empirically). 
As a result of this, law is thus the observable phenomenon of legislation, adjudication and 
other legal institutions. 
 
Bearing this in mind legal positivism is suited to research questions which involve the 
description and explanation of the law as it is, including the analysis of legal texts to 
determine their meaning. There will be an examination of the Statutory and common law 
regimes which are applicable as well as the study of case law jurisprudence.  
 
The study will be strictly law focused and will not at any point make reference to the aspect 
of morality in law.  
1.4. The rationale or purpose conducting research in respect of this topic: 
Leading South African academics have long been in favour of a change in South African 
company law to curtain the operation of the doctrine of constructive notice in regard to 
limitations on directors' authority in the Memorandum of Incorporation. Further, third parties 
who may be acting in good faith (bona fide) need to be aware of indoor or internal company 
procedures and the consequences of not complying with same. On the other hand, it is also 
important to be aware of mala fide third parties who contract with juristic personalities and 
the consequences thereof. With that being said, a very basic restatement of the law in respect 
of representation of a company and the current standard of the application of the Turquand 
rule is necessary. 
 
1.5. The background of the topic: 
1.5.1 Introduction: 
 
The Companies Act of 200814 had a long and arduous path to come into existence. Capacity 
and representation of a company are some of the most important principles of company law 
as this is the interface with the outside world, and certainty for the company and third parties 
should be a given. However, in practice this has never been the case and the concepts have 
been confused with one another and on their own by the courts, academics and students. The 
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confusion was not because of anything else but the extraordinary complexity of these 
concepts if one were to stray from the most basic principles.15 
 
Prior to 1 April 2011, the date on which the Companies Act 200816 came into force, the  
authority to enter into a contract on behalf of a company was governed by generally 
applicable agency principles supplemented by the common-law doctrine of constructive 
notice and the common- law Turquand17 rule. This dissertation seeks to highlight some of the 
problems brought about by the changes made to the law in this regard by the Act.  
 
It does not deal with the situation where authority to contract on behalf of the company is 
lacking because the contract is beyond the company’s capacity. It is assumed, therefore, that 
the contract in question in this note is within the company’s capacity. 
 
1.5.2 The common law: 
 
In terms of the common law, a person dealing with a company cannot assert as against the 
company that he did not know the contents of the public documents of the company. This is 
known as the doctrine of constructive notice. As a result of the doctrine, a person has no legal 
grounds for complaint if the transaction he enters into with the company is held not to be 
binding on the company because it patently conflicts with the company’s requirements as laid 
down in the company’s public documents, regardless of whether that person had in fact 
inspected those documents and became aware of those requirements.18 The transaction may 
be invalid, however, not because it patently conflicts with a requirement of its public 
documents, but because some required condition has not been fulfilled, or because some 
required procedure has not been followed. An inspection of the public documents will not 
reveal whether it has been fulfilled or followed.19 
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In these circumstances the rule in the case of Royal British Bank v Turquand 20  (‘the 
Turquand rule’) provides that ‘persons contracting with a company and dealing in good faith 
may assume that acts within its constitution and powers have been properly and duly 
performed and are not bound to enquire whether acts of internal management have been 
regular. Such protection by the Turquand rule21 is understandably not available, however, if 
the person was aware of the irregularity or suspected such an irregularity.22 
 
1.5.3 The statutory law: 
 
Section 228 of the Companies Act 61 of 197323 at the time provided: 
 
‘Disposal of undertaking or greater part of assets of company. 
(1)  Notwithstanding anything contained in its memorandum or articles, the 
directors of a company shall not have the power, save with the approval of 
a general meeting of the company, to dispose of:24 
(a)  the whole or substantially the whole of the undertaking of the 
company; or25 
(b) the whole or the greater part of the assets of the company.26 
 
(2)  No resolution of the company approving any such disposal shall have 
effect unless it authorizes or ratifies in terms the specific transaction.’27 
 
Turning now to the 2008 Companies Act28, some of the provisions of the Act relevant to the 
current status of the common law doctrine of constructive notice and the Turquand29 rule are 
s 19(4)30, s 19(5)31, s 20(7)32 and s 20(8)33. Section 19(4)34 and 19(5)35 deal with the doctrine 
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of constructive notice, and s 20(7)36 , read with s 20(8)37 , appears to create a statutory 
Turquand rule38 while explicitly retaining the common-law Turquand rule. These provisions 
will be set out for the convenience of the reader and then discussed. 
 
Section 19(4) and 19(5) provide39: 
 
‘(4)  Subject to subsection (5), a person must not be regarded as having received 
notice or knowledge of the contents of any document relating to a 
company merely because the document:40 
 
(a) has been filed; or 
 
 (b)  is accessible for inspection at an office of the company.’41 
 
‘(5)  A person must be regarded as having notice and knowledge of: 
 
(a)  any provision of a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation 
contemplated in section 15(2)(b) or (c42) if the company’s name includes 
the element ‘‘RF’’ as contemplated in section 11(3)(b 43 ), and the 
company’s Notice of Incorporation or a subsequent Notice of Amendment 
has drawn attention to the relevant provision, as contemplated in section 
13(3)44; and 
 
(b)  the effect of subsection (3) on a personal liability company.’45 
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Sections 20(7) and 20(8) provide:46 
 
‘(7)  A person dealing with a company in good faith, other than a director, 
prescribed officer or shareholder of the company, is entitled to presume 
that the company, in making any decision in the exercise of its powers, has 
complied with all of the formal and procedural requirements in terms of 
this Act, its Memorandum of Incorporation and any rules of the company 
unless, in the circumstances, the person knew or reasonably ought to have 
known of any failure by the company to comply with any such requirement.47 
 
(8)  Subsection (7) must be construed concurrently with, and not in substitution 
for, any relevant common law principle relating to the presumed 
validity of the actions of a company in the exercise of its powers.’48 
In terms of  s 20(7)49, it is arguable that delegation by the board of a company to an ordinary 
director of authority to enter into a transaction on behalf of the company in terms of the 
‘rules’ of a company is a ‘formal’ or ‘procedural’ requirement and a third person dealing with 
such a director can, in terms of s 20(7)50, presume that the company has complied with such 
requirement (s 20(7)51 refers to ‘formal and procedural requirements’ in terms of, inter alia, 
‘rules’ of the company). If so, s 20(7)52 is in this respect, again, at odds with the 
common-law Turquand rule53. 
 
Section 20(7)54 also clashes with the common-law Turquand rule55 in relation to ‘insiders’. 
Section 20(7)56 does not protect a ‘director, prescribed officer or shareholder of the company’ 
(ie ‘insiders’). The common-law Turquand rule’s57  protection, on the other hand, is not 
entirely out of an insider’s grasp. There are clearly circumstances in which insiders will be 
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Section 19(4)59 read with s 19(5)60, it will be observed, abolishes the doctrine of 
constructive notice, except where the following requirements are met: 
 
 the memorandum of incorporation contains restrictive conditions applicable 
to the company; 
 
 the company’s name includes the element ‘‘RF’’ (see also s 11(3)(b)); and 
 
 the company’s Notice of Incorporation or a subsequent Notice of Amendment has 
drawn attention to the restrictive conditions.61 
 
It appears that a positive doctrine of constructive notice may be provided for by s 19(4)62 in 
the circumstances set out in s 19(5)63. It follows that, unlike the common-law doctrine, the 
statutory doctrine may be of assistance to a third party in certain circumstances and not only 
the company. This could hardly have been intended by the legislature, but it seems that it can 
be construed in this way. 
 
The knowledge that s 19(4)64 says a person ‘must not be regarded as having’ does not include 
knowledge of provisions of the Act. Section 19(4)65 only refers to knowledge of the contents 
of any document relating to a company. Hence, a person is regarded as having knowledge of, 
for example, provisions of the Act requiring a special resolution. This is, of course, in 
keeping with the general maxim ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse’. Or perhaps more to the 
point, where the validity of a transaction is conditional on compliance with a statutory 
requirement, the issue is simply whether or not that requirement was fulfilled, and knowledge 
or the lack thereof is irrelevant. 
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Turning to s 20(7)66, it is arguable that delegation by the board of a company to an ordinary 
director of authority to enter into a transaction on behalf of the company in terms of the 
‘rules’ of a company is a ‘formal’ or ‘procedural’ requirement and a third person dealing with 
such a director can, in terms of s 20(7)67, presume that the company has complied with such 
requirement s 20(7)68 refers to ‘formal and procedural requirements’ in terms of, inter alia, 
‘rules’ of the company). If so, s 20(7)69 is in this respect, again, at odds with the 
common-law Turquand rule70. 
 
Section 20(7)71 also clashes with the common-law Turquand rule72 in relation to ‘insiders’. 
Section 20(7)73 does not protect a ‘director, prescribed officer or shareholder of the company’ 
(ie ‘insiders’). The common-law Turquand rule’s74  protection, on the other hand, is not 





In the foregoing conclusion it can be established that both the common law and statutory law 
principles with regard to the Turquand Rule 75  and corporate capacity is of particular 
importance. The rationale behind these principles as encompassed in the statutory law 
involves and inculcates situations wherein a bona fide third party may be exploited or 
alternatively, an employee / director may not act within their due capacity. While criticisms 
will accordingly be jilted towards corporate capacity and the Turquand Rule 76 , its high 
standing efficiency in the South African law seems to be worthy of its position. 
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2.1. Legal capacity of a company: 
In order for a contract to be legally binding against a company, there are two company law 
requirements that must be fulfilled. The first requirement is that the company must have the 
legal capacity to enter into a contract. The second requirement is that the person (either a 
director or agent) representing the company must have the authority to enter into the contract 
on behalf of the company.77  
Hence, both these requirements namely capacity and authority are essential prerequisites for a 
binding contract. However, these two terms, although being closely linked are two extremely 
different concepts. Capacity refers to the legal competency and powers of the company 
whereas authority refers to the power of the person representing the company. The 
company’s representative may be a director or agent or any individual acting on behalf of the 
company. Authority may also be regarded as delegated power. 78    
2.2. The ultra vires79 Doctrine: 
2.2.1. What is the ultra vires doctrine? 
The legal capacity of a company was previously determined as per the main objects of the 
company which were set out in the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation. The objective 
of a company made it able to understand the existence of a company as a legal person. 80 
According to the ultra vires doctrine, a company existed in law, only for the purpose set out 
in the object clause of the memorandum of association. Beyond these limits, a company was 
deemed to have no legal existence. 81 
Hence, it is understood that previously if a company had performed a certain act or entered 
into a transaction and in doing so acted out of the objects set out in the memorandum of 
incorporation, then it was deemed so that the company exceeded its legal capacity and the 
company ceased to exist as a legal person for the purposes of the specific contract or 
transaction. The consequence of such a situation resulted in that contract being null and void 
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 Ultra vires refers to beyond or outside the powers  
80
 See note 14 
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and there was certainly no possibility of ratification despite potential or possible consent or 
assent by the shareholders’, directors’ and/or other stakeholders’. 82 
In the case of Re Horsley & Weight Ltd83 the court once again reiterated that a company had 
no power to act outside of its memorandum of incorporation. In this case it was held that “a 
power given to a company by its memorandum of association to grant a pension held to be 
capable of subsist as a substantial object and not merely as an incidental power. The pension 
was consequently not ultra vires”. 84 
Therefore, an ultra vires act refers to those transactions that were regarded as null and void 
due to the fact that they fell outside the scope of the company’s powers as stated in the 
company’s constitution and such an act could never become intra vires by reason of 
ratification. Nevertheless, such an act or transactions must never be regarded as illegal or 
unauthorised and the term ultra vires must be confined to its strict definition.85  
2.2.2. The legal consequences of the ultra vires doctrine: 
The legal consequence of an ultra vires contract resulted in a further consequence than 
simply rendering the contract null and void. This consequence was regarded as an external 
consequence. There were also two internal consequences to every ultra vires contract. 
Internal consequences refer to consequences that arise between the company, its directors and 
shareholders. These consequences still remain relevant to the modern company law and to the 
Companies Act of 200886. 87 
The first internal consequence is that in every ultra vires contract entered into by any 
representative of the company could not possibly have had the authority to enter into that 
contract. If the company did not have the legal capacity to enter into the contract, its directors 
and other agents could not possibly have authority to enter into the contract on behalf of the 
company. It follows that the directors and or the agents would have exceeded their powers 
and authority and would, as a result, be liable to the company for damages for breach of their 
fiduciary duty not to exceed their authority. 88 
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The second internal consequence of an ultra vires contract was that, since, the company in 
entering into an ultra vires contract would inevitably have failed to comply with the 
requirements of its constitution, every shareholder of the company would have been entitled 
at common law to institute legal proceedings to restrain the company from entering into or 
performing an ultra vires contract due to the contractual nature of the company’s constitution. 
The constitution of a company formed, and still forms the basis for a statutory contractual 
relationship between the company and its shareholders. The ultra vires doctrine consequently 
played and continues to play a pivotal role in internal disputes. 89 
2.2.3. The failure of the ultra vires doctrine: 
Companies were easily able to circumvent the ultra vires doctrine by specifying in detail and 
as widely as possible in their object clauses all the business activities the company might 
wish to pursue, together with a comprehensive and detailed catalogue of ancillary powers. It 
was later on established by Lord Wrenbury in the case of Cotman v Brougham90 that the 
function of the objects clause was not to specify or disclose but to bury beneath a mass of 
words the real object of the company with the intent that every conceivable form of activity 
shall be found included somewhere its terms. Hence, instead of disclosing the company’s 
main business activities, the objects clause disclosed it. 91 
Drafting techniques thus enabled companies to evade the ultra vires doctrine. The ultra vires 
doctrine developed into an illusory protection for shareholders and a pitfall for unwary third 
parties dealing with the company. The original purpose of the ultra vires doctrine was 
frustrated and stifled by the independent objects clause.92 
The acceptance by the House of Lords in Cotman v Broughman93 was taken even further in 
the case of Bell Houses Ltd v City Wall Properties Ltd94 where the court accepted the validity 
of a subjective objects clause. A subjective objects clause empowered the board of directors 
to carry on any business which, in the opinion of the board could be advantageously carried 
on by the company. 95A subjective objects clause permitted the company to pursue any 
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activity that the directors considered to be related to the company’s main object. In accepting 
the subjective objects clause, the court deprived the ultra vires doctrine of all its remaining 
validity. It was consequently observed that the victory of the subjective objects clause must 
be the beginning of the ultra vires doctrine. The case of Bell House96s reduced the ultra vires 
doctrine to obsolescence and this doctrine was no longer positive and it certainly did not 
serve a useful purpose. 97   
2.2.4. The reform of the ultra vires doctrine: 
Pursuant to the decision in the Bell House98s case discussed above, almost all common- law 
jurisdictions that had adopted the ultra vires doctrine either abandoned or reformed the 
doctrine by statutory amendment.99  
In South African law, this was done in terms of section 36 of the 1973 Companies Act100.  
Section 36101 did not entirely abolish the ultra vires doctrine, instead, it abolished only the 
external requirements of an ultra vires contract while preserving the internal consequences. It 
remained mandatory for a company to state its objects clause in its Memorandum of 
Incorporation. In terms of section 36 of the 1973 Act102, an ultra vires contract was no longer 
void by reason only of lack of authority or capacity on the part of the directors to enter into 
an ultra vires contract on behalf of the company. The directors’ lack of authority did not 
affect the company provided that such lack of authority arose from a lack of capacity.  
Externally, the ultra vires contract was valid and binding between the company and the other 
party to the contract.103 
The intention of section 36 of the 1973 Act104 is incorporated in section 20 (5) of the 2008 
Act105 precludes that if a company in legal proceedings against a third party, cannot assert or 
rely on its lack of capacity. The dispute must be resolved as if the lack of capacity did not 
exist. While the external consequences of the ultra vires contract were abolished, the internal 
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consequences were preserved by section 36 of the 1973 Act106 and currently, the external 
consequences are still preserved by section 20 (5) of the 2008 Act.107  
As between the company, its directors’ and shareholders’, the directors’ would still be liable 
to the company for any breach of fiduciary duty not to exceed their authority and 
shareholders of the company are entitled to restrain the company and or its directors’ from 
entering into an ultra vires contract. Once a contract is concluded, shareholders’ lose their 
right to restraint of performance of the contract, hence, the contract is no longer void. The 
liability of the directors’ for breach of fiduciary duty still applies to render directors’ liable 
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3.1. What is the doctrine of constructive notice: 
The doctrine of constructive notice is a common law doctrine which was laid down in the 
case of Ernest v Nicholls109 in 1857. This doctrine illustrated that any person dealing with a 
company was deemed to be aware of the contents of the constitution and other documentation 
of the company which were public in nature and which was lodged with the Registrar of 
Companies and which documents were accessible and available for public inspection. 110 The 
doctrine of constructive notice was however abolished in terms of section 19 (4) of the 2008 
act.111 
3.2. The applicability of the doctrine of constructive notice in terms of the statutory and 
common law: 
Section 19(4) and 19(5) provide:112 
‘(4)  Subject to subsection (5), a person must not be regarded as having received notice or 
knowledge of the contents of any document relating to a company merely because the 
document: 
(a)  has been filed; or 
 (b)  is accessible for inspection at an office of the company.’113 
 
‘(5)  A person must be regarded as having notice and knowledge of:114 
 
(a)  any provision of a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation contemplated 
in section 15(2)(b) or (c) if the company’s name include the element ‘‘RF’’ as 
contemplated in section 11(3)(b), and the company’s Notice of Incorporation 
or a subsequent Notice of Amendment has drawn attention to the relevant 
provision, as contemplated in section 13(3); and 
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(b)  the effect of subsection (3) on a personal liability company.’115 
Section 19(4) read with s 19(5), it will be observed, abolishes the doctrine of constructive 
notice, except where the following requirements are met: 
 the memorandum of incorporation contains restrictive conditions applicable 
to the company; 
 the company’s name includes the element ‘‘RF’’; and 
 the company’s Notice of Incorporation or a subsequent Notice of Amendment has 
drawn attention to the restrictive conditions.116 
 
It will be noted that the common-law doctrine of constructive notice does not, like s 19(4) 
and s 19(5), regard a person as having received notice or knowledge of the contents of any 
public document relating to a company. The doctrine is a negative doctrine operating in 
favour of a company, and not a positive doctrine in favour also of a third person dealing with 
the company. The doctrine operates against the person who has failed to inquire, but does not 
operate in his favour. 117It operates to prevent the contractor from saying that he did not know 
that the constitution of the corporation rendered a particular act or a particular delegation of 
authority ultra vires the corporation. It does not entitle him to say that he relied on some 
unusual provision in the constitution of the corporation if he did not in fact so rely.118 
 
It appears that a positive doctrine of constructive notice may be provided for by s 19(4)119 in 
the circumstances set out in s 19(5)120. It follows that, unlike the common-law doctrine, the 
statutory doctrine may be of assistance to a third party in certain circumstances and not only 
the company. This could hardly have been intended by the legislature, but it seems that it can 
be construed in this way. The knowledge that s 19(4)121 says a person ‘must not be regarded 
as having’ does not include knowledge of provisions of the Act. Section 19(4) only refers to 
knowledge of ‘the contents of any document relating to a company’.122 
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Hence, a person is regarded as having knowledge of, for example, provisions of the Act 
requiring a special resolution. This is, of course, in keeping with the general maxim 
‘ignorance of the law is no excuse’.123 Or perhaps more to the point, where the validity of a 
transaction is conditional on compliance with a statutory requirement, the issue is simply 
whether or not that requirement was fulfilled, and knowledge or the lack thereof is irrelevant. 
The provision of section 19 (4)124 states that subject to the provisions of section 19 (5)125, a 
person may not be regarded as having received notice or knowledge of the contents of any 
documents relating to the company merely because the document has been filed with the 
Registrar and available and accessible for inspection.126 
Initially section 19 (5) 127  provided that a person was deemed to know of any special 
conditions which applied to the company provided that the company had drawn attention to 
these special conditions in the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation. However, upon an 
investigation of the bill, it was concluded that such a provision would have provided 
uncertainty as the term special condition was undefined.  Section 19 (5)128 was therefore 
amended and it presently introduces a version of the doctrine of constructive notice which 
applies to two specific situations.  
This section now provides that a person may be regarded as having knowledge of the 
provisions of the company’s memorandum of incorporation as contemplated in section        
15 (2) (b) or (c) of the 2008 act129 if the company’s name is inclusive of the expression “RF” 
and the company’s memorandum of incorporation or a subsequent amendment thereto draws 
attention to the relevant provision as contemplated in section 13 (3) of the Act.130 
Section 15 (2) (b)131 of the Act provides that a company’s memorandum of incorporation may 
contain any restrictive conditions which is applicable to a company in addition to the 
requirements set out in section 16 of the Act. Section 16 deals with the amendments of a 
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company’s memorandum of incorporation. The memorandum of incorporation may even 
prohibit the amendment of any specific provision of the company’s memorandum of 
incorporation.132 Section 13 (3)133 states that if a company’s memorandum of incorporation 
includes any provision contemplated in section 15 (2) (b) or (c)134 then the company’s notice 
of incorporation must include a statement which draws attention to each provision and its 
location in the company’s memorandum of incorporation. In addition thereto, the expression 
“RF” which means ring fenced must be suffixed to the name of the company. The expression 
“RF” is thus designed to alert third parties to restrictive conditions which are applicable to 
ring fenced companies.135 If a third party ignores this warning, they will personally bear the 
consequences as they are deemed to be aware of the provisions.136 
The second instance where the doctrine of constructive notice will apply is the case of a 
personal liability company. A profit company is a personal liability company if it satisfies the 
criteria for a private company and its memorandum of incorporation states that it is a personal 
liability company. Its memorandum of incorporation must prohibit it from offering any of its 
securities to the public and the transferability of its securities. The directors of a person 
liability company including the past directors are jointly and severally liable together with the 
company for any debts and liabilities of the company that are or were contracted. Persons 
dealing with a personal liability company are deemed to be aware of the effect of the 
directors’ joint and several liability for the debts and liability of the company which was 
contracted during their periods of office. Despite the 2008 act 137 , the rationale of this 
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4. The Turquand rule: 
4.1. What is the Turquand rule: 
The Turquand rule was formulated as an exception to the doctrine of constructive notice and 
was created to mitigate the harshness of the doctrine of constructive notice. The Turquand 
rule is also referred to as the indoor management rule as those dealing with the company are 
not affected by the company’s internal rules and regulations.139  
The Turquand rule was derived from the case of Royal British Bank v Turquand140. This case 
involved restrictions placed by the constitution of a company on the authority of the directors. 
Turquand was the liquidator of a mining company and this was an action for the return of the 
money which was borrowed from Royal British Bank who was the Plaintiff. In this case, the 
articles of association of the company authorised its board of directors to borrow money 
under the condition that the board obtained the prior approval by the ordinary resolution of 
the shareholders of the company. The board borrowed money from the Royal British Bank 
without obtaining the approval of the shareholders of the company. Royal British Bank had 
no knowledge of this. The court therefore ruled that even though the board of directors had 
failed to comply with the company’s articles of association, the company was still bound by 
the loan taken from Royal British Bank. The approval of the shareholders as stipulated in the 
company’s articles of association was an internal formality and the bank, which party acted in 
good faith, was entitled to assume that the internal formality in compliance with the 
company’s articles of association was complied with.141  
This rule was applied in South Africa in the case of Mine Workers’ Union v Prinsloo142. 
The Turquand rule protects bona fide third parties who are unaware of any internal 
regulations that affect the validity of a contract with a company. Third parties’ are protected 
by the rule provided that they act in good faith, which will then entitle them to assume that 
the internal requirements in order to have a contract have been complied with.  The third 
party who is genuinely acting in good faith while contracting with a company is under no 
duty to ensure that all internal company procedures and formalities have been complied with. 
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143Hence, the main basis of the Turquand rule is to ensure that innocent bona fide third 
parties’ are not prejudiced by a company’s failure to comply with its own internal procedures 
and formalities as set out in the company’s memorandum of incorporation.144 
The Turquand rule is deemed to be justified for the purposes of business convenience as 
business dealings would result in much difficulty if third parties were required to enquire as 
to the internal procedures of a company and ensure that those requirements have been 
complied with. A third party contracting with a company is entitled to assume that the 
internal formalities have been adhered to unless he or she is aware or suspects that they have 
not been complied with.145 
The Turquand rule prevents a company from escaping liability under a valid contract solely 
on the grounds that a certain internal formality or procedure was not complied with. Proof by 
a company that it has failed to fulfil its own internal requirements is not a sufficient basis for 
escaping liability.146 
In the case of Mahoney v East Holyford Mining Co Ltd147, the court expressed the Turquand 
rule as:  
“when there are persons conducting the affairs of a company in a manner that it appears to be 
perfectly consonant with the articles of association, then so dealings with them, externally, 
are not to be affected by any irregularities which may take place in the internal management 
of a company.148”  
In the 1946 case of Morris v Kanssen149 the court held that the Turquand rule is a rule 
designed for the protection of those entitled to assume, just because they cannot know, that 
the person with whom they deal with has the authority as he claims. The court went on to 
further state that the Turquand rule “cannot be invoked if he who would invoke it is put upon 
his inquiry.” 
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The Turquand rule applies to all internal irregularities that take place in the management of a 
company.150 At common law, the Turquand rule would also apply to a situation whereby a 
defective appointment of a director of a company or alternatively any internal irregularity that 
may occur in the management of a company.151 
The Turquand rule however does not protect a third party who is aware or suspects that an 
internal requirement or formality has not been complied with. The Turquand rule goes on to 
further renounce a third party of protection if the third party suspects that an internal 
requirement or procedure has not been complied with and deliberately turns a blind eye to 
such procedure.152 This was formulated in the case of Howard v Patent Ivory Manufacturing 
Co.Howard v Patent Ivory Manufacturing Co153. 
In the case of Moris v Kanssen  court stated that:- 
“a person cannot presume in his own favour that things are rightly done if inquiry that he 
ought to make would tell him that they were wrongly done.” Therefore, the rule cannot be 
invoked by a third party who is put on inquiry and fails to make inquiry.   
In the case of Northside Development (Pty) Ltd v Registrar- General154  the court stated that a 
third party who lacks knowledge but is nevertheless suspicious that an internal irregularity 
may have taken place, cannot rely on the Turquand rule. The circumstances of the third party 
in this case were such that the third party should have made the inquiry. At paragraph 619, 
the court held “if the nature of the transaction is such as to excite a reasonable apprehension 
that the transaction entered into for purposes apparently unrelated to the company’s business, 
it will put the person dealing with the company upon inquiry”.155 
The Turquand rule does not protect a third party who relies on forged documents. In the case 
of Reuben v Great Fingall Consolidated 156the Plaintiff lent money to the secretary of the 
Defendant company. The money was lent on the security of a share certificate that had been 
issued to the Plaintiff certifying that the Plaintiff was the registered transferee of certain 
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shares. The secretary had issued the share certificate without any authority to do so, after 
having forged the signature of the directors of the Defendant company and thereafter affixing 
the seal of the Defendant company into the share certificate. The Plaintiff sued the Defendant 
for damages when the company refused to register him as the holder of the shares. The court 
in this case held that since the Defendant company had not held out that the company 
secretary had the authority to issue the share certificate, the company was not bound by this 
act. The Turquand rule did not apply to the forged share certificate and thus the forged share 
certificate was a nullity.157  
Cassim158 states that the Turquand rule is intended for the protection of outsiders who have 
no means of knowing whether internal formalities and procedures required under the 
company’s constitution have been complied with. Directors and other insiders may however 
not rely on this rule. The directors of a company are deemed to have knowledge as to whether 
the internal requirements, formalities and procedures have been complied with. Directors are 
not entitled to assume that internal requirements, formalities and procedures have been 
complied with, when, due to their own misconduct or neglect, these internal requirements 
were not adhered to.159 
In the case of Hely – Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd160 , the court distinguished between a 
director acting in his or her capacity as a director or a director acting in his or her capacity as 
a director but rather as an outsider contracting with the company. The court suggested that in 
the latter instance, the director may rely on the Turquand rule. This attempt to narrow down 
the rule that insiders may not rely on the Turquand rule draws a distinction between inside 
and outside transactions.161 
According to Cassim,162  in such an instance, it is inevitable that the question regarding 
whether the Turquand rule is merely an application of agency principles and particularly 
ostensible authority or whether it is an independent and special rule of company law that 
imposes liability on the company for unauthorised transactions independently of estoppel and 
ostensible authority should arise.163 
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In South African law and according to the case of Prinsloo164, the weight of authority leans 
towards the view that the Turquand rule is an independent and special rule of company law  
and relates to companies rather than an instance of general principles of agency law. The 
Turquand rule in South African law would impose liability on the company for unauthorised 
contracts where all that was lacking was compliance with internal formalities, procedures and 
requirements. Estoppel requirements consequently need not be satisfied in order to rely on the 
Turquand rule.165  
4.2. The Turquand rule and the statutory law: 
Sections 20(7) and 20(8)166 provide: 
 
‘(7)  A person dealing with a company in good faith, other than a director, 
prescribed officer or shareholder of the company, is entitled to presume 
that the company, in making any decision in the exercise of its powers, has 
complied with all of the formal and procedural requirements in terms of 
this Act, its Memorandum of Incorporation and any rules of the company 
unless, in the circumstances, the person knew or reasonably ought to have 
known of any failure by the company to comply with any such requirement.167 
 
(8)  Subsection (7) must be construed concurrently with, and not in substitution 
for, any relevant common law principle relating to the presumed 
validity of the actions of a company in the exercise of its powers.168 
Section 20 (7) of the act 169states that a person dealing with a company in good faith other 
than a director, prescribed officer or shareholder of the company, is entitled to assume that 
the company, in making any decision in the exercise of its powers has complied with all the 
formal and procedural requirements in terms of the Act170, its memorandum of incorporation 
and any rules of the company unless, given the circumstances, the person knew or reasonably 
ought to have known of any failure of the company to comply with such requirements. 
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This is a statutory formation of what in essence is the common law Turquand rule. 
Section 20(7)171 applies to internal requirements and formalities even if they are prescribed 
by the Companies Act. The fact that internal formality is contained in the statute should make 
no difference to the application of section 20(7). This section is very wide and is also 
applicable to all of the company’s formal and procedural requirements in terms of the 
company’s Memorandum of Incorporation.172  
Section 20(7)173 also encapsulates the common-law rule concerning a third party being a 
director, prescribed officer or shareholder of the company, such a person will not be protected 
by section 20(7). The basis of this exception is that a director, prescribed officer or 
shareholder ought to have reasonably known of the company’s compliance or non-
compliance regarding the company’s internal procedures. They have access to the company’s 
records at any given time. A shareholder is deemed to have more information than an outsider 
in the form of notices of meetings and proposed resolutions at shareholder meetings. Section 
20(7) refers to shareholders and not to the holders of a company’s securities such as holders 
of the company’s debt instruments who are not necessarily insiders of the company.174 
Section 20(8)175 preserves the Turquand rule as developed at common law. It provides that 
Section 20(7) must be construed concurrently with and not in substitution for the common 
law principle relating to the presumed validity of the actions of the company in the exercise 
of its powers. There is therefore, now, in our South African law, both, a common law and a 
statutory law indoor management rule.176  
An unfortunate difficulty arises due to the fact that section 20(7) is not properly aligned with 
the common-law formulation of the Turquand rule. The overlap between the two is 
sometimes a source of difficulty in practice. Section 20 (7)177 is likely to operate more widely 
in some respects than the common law rule and narrowly in other respects. The common law 
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Turquand rule, as stated above, will not protect a third party who knew or suspected that an 
internal formality had not been complied with. 178 
Section 20(7) however, goes much further than this. Section 20(7)179 excludes a party who 
ought to have reasonably known of non- compliance with an internal requirement or 
procedure. This test is an objective one. It displaces the presumption “if the third party ought 
to have reasonably known”180. This weakens the assumption that third parties may make 
regarding the compliance with a company’s internal requirements, procedures and 
formalities. To this extent it is narrower than the common law rule. 181 
In this respect section 128 (4)182 of the Australian Corporations Law 2001 unambiguously 
states that a third party may not assume that internal formalities have been complied with if 
he or she knew or suspected that the assumption was incorrect at the time of his or her 
dealings with the company. According to Cassim183, it is this sort of provision that ought to 
have been adopted by section 20(7) of the Act184.  
One possible advantage of the approach adopted in the Act is that, if, for whatever reasons, 
the requirements of section 20(7) are not complied with, a bona fide third party may still, in 
terms of section 20 (8) of the Act185, be entitled to rely on the common law Turquand rule. 
As a result of the wording of section 20(7) in excluding third parties who reasonably ought to 
have known of the internal non – compliance of formalities, requirements and procedures, 
difficult distinctions would have to be drawn between being put on inquiry and ought to 
know. The provision would be understandable if it was aimed only at precluding reliance on 
section 20(7)186 by a director, a prescribed officer or a shareholder. According to Cassim187, 
this is clearly not the intention of the legislature in the provision. 
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Cassim188 states “with respect, a much more lucid provision is to be found in section 18(1) 
and section 18 (2)189  of the Canada Business Corporations Act. These sections exclude 
reliance on this presumption by an insider who has knowledge or ought to have knowledge 
by virtue of his position with or relationship to the corporation knowledge to the contrary190. 
It is significant that, unlike section 20(7)191 the common- law Turquand rule is not confined 
to companies only. The courts have extended the rule to apply to technikons and trade unions. 
In the case of F P W Engineering Solution (Pty) Ltd v Technikon Pretoria and Others192, it 
was established that the common law Turquand rule was applicable to Technikons and in the 
case of Prinsloo193 the court held that the common law Turquand rule was applicable to trade 
unions. The common law Turquand rule went on further to incorporate municipalities as 
depicted in the case of Potchefstroom se Stadsraad v Kotze194. 195 
According to Cassim196, the Turquand rule is growing in importance, however, perhaps due 
to the abolition of the doctrine of constructive notice, as discussed earlier, there may be less 
of a need for an indoor management rule. This is not to suggest in any way to come to a 
conclusion that the Turquand rule is no longer of importance. In terms of South African law, 
there would be nothing odd in preserving the indoor management rule and in doing so, 
simultaneously abolishing the doctrine of constructive notice as English law has adopted this 
approach several years ago.  
 Cassim 197  states that an important consequence of the abolition of the doctrine of 
constructive notice which must be emphasized is that the common law Turquand rule and 
section 20 (7) of the Act198, will now, unlike the past, be applicable where a special resolution 
will be required as an internal requirement, formality or procedure. Since there is no longer 
any constructive notice of special resolution filed by the company with the Companies 
Commission, it follows that there is no longer any legal obstacle to applying Section 20 (7) or 
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the Turquand rule to a special resolution required by the Act or the company’s Memorandum 
of Incorporation to validate a particular act of management. 
The meaning of s 20(7) and s 20(8),199 which must be construed together, is obscure. Section 
20(7) appears to be a ‘statutory Turquand rule’. However, instead of simply creating a 
statutory Turquand rule in place of the common law Turquand rule, s 20(7) and s 20(8), when 
read together, appear to preserve the common-law Turquand rule. The Turquand rule is a 
‘common law principle relating to the presumed validity of the actions of a company in the 
exercise of its powers’ and s 20(7)  must therefore, as required by s 20(8), be ‘construed 
concurrently with, and not in substitution for’ the common law Turquand rule. The wording 
‘concurrently with and not in substitution for’ in s 20(8) indicates that the statutory rule in 
s 20(7) and the common-law principle co-exist and the common law is not eclipsed in any 
way. It does not appear to be a case of the common law continuing to apply but subject to s 
20(7), or vice versa. The wording does not appear to permit such a meaning. The words 
‘concurrently with’, it is submitted, mean ‘along with’ and the phrase ‘not in substitution for’ 
reinforces the interpretation that the common law and the statutory rule co-exist.200 
 
The problem with this interpretation is that s 20(7) and the common law Turquand rule 
conflict in certain respects, which will be apparent from the following discussion of s 20(7)  
Cassim201 refers to the difficulty that s 20(7) ‘is not properly aligned with the common law 
formulation of the Turquand rule’.  
 
Unlike the common-law rule, s 20(7) protects the innocent third party where the formal or 
procedural requirement in question is laid down by the Act. As Stand 242202 and Farren203 
show, the common-law Turquand rule does not apply in such a case, at least not in one 
instance, namely, the disposal by a company of the whole or the greater part of the 
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company’s assets. The basis on which the decisions was reached in Stand 242204 namely the 
protection of shareholders, raises the question of the extent to which the ratio in these cases 
can be extended to the numerous other instances in the Act where a special resolution is 
required. 
 
It will be recognised that in all these instances the special resolution requirement is aimed at 
the protection of shareholders, and it seems that on this basis the common law Turquand rule 
would not apply if the requirement is not met. It should also be borne in mind that in some of 
these instances in the absence of the special resolution it is expressly provided and that the 
resolution to enter into the particular transaction is void205. It follows that the common law 
Turquand rule clearly cannot apply in these instances, whereas it is arguable that there is a 
clash between these provisions and s 20(7)206.  
 
 In terms of the common law, a person dealing with the managing director of a company can 
assume that authority has been delegated to the managing director if such delegation is 
possible in terms of the company’s constitution. However, if in terms of a company’s 
constitution, authority to act on behalf of a company can be delegated to an ordinary director, 
a third person dealing with the director cannot, generally, relying on the Turquand rule, 
assume that the internal requirement of delegation has taken place.  
 
As Sargent LJ said in Houghton & Co v Northard, Lowe and Wills Ltd 207at paragraph 267: 
‘I know of no case in which an ordinary director, acting without authority in fact, has been 
held capable of binding a company by a contract with a third party, merely on the ground 
that the third party assumed the director had been given authority by the board to make the 
contract.’208 
 
Where the directors are empowered to delegate their powers, it cannot be assumed that a 
power has been delegated unless the power in question is one which is usually delegated to 
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persons holding the office held (de jure or de facto) by the person purporting to transact on 
behalf of the company. Thus, for example, because powers to transact on behalf of the 
company are not usually delegated to ordinary directors, the rule in Turquand’s case does not 
apply where an ordinary director purports to contract on behalf of the company even where 
the articles empower the board of directors to delegate their powers to an ordinary 
director. Thus the rule can apply in the case of such a director only where the power in 
question has in fact been delegated to him but his actual exercise of it is made subject to some 
act of internal organisation. 
 
On the other hand, because the board of directors is ordinarily the organ of the company 
vested with plenary powers on matters intra vires the company, the rule applies where the 
board has contracted. And, because the boards of companies usually delegate all their powers 
to manage the business of the company to a managing director, a person who deals with a 
managing director may assume that the power to manage the business of the company has 
been delegated to him. Perhaps this limitation on the rule in Turquand’s case is best 
understood as merely an instance of the principle that a person dealing with a company 
cannot invoke the rule if put on enquiry. He is put on enquiry, because the power in question 
is not usually delegated the person in the position of those purporting to exercise it. Where 
the person acting on behalf of the company acts beyond his usual authority, the company 
may, of course, be bound on the basis of estoppel if it held him out as having the necessary 
authority’. 
 
Turning to s 20(7), it is arguable that delegation by the board of a company to an ordinary 
director of authority to enter into a transaction on behalf of the company in terms of the 
‘rules’ of a company is a ‘formal’ or ‘procedural’ requirement and a third person dealing with 
such a director can, in terms of s 20(7), presume that the company has complied with such 
requirement (s 20(7) refers to ‘formal and procedural requirements’ in terms of, inter alia, 
‘rules’ of the company). If so, s 20(7)209 is in this respect, again, at odds with the common 
law Turquand rule. 
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Section 20(7) also clashes with the common-law Turquand rule in relation to ‘insiders’. 
Section 20(7) does not protect a ‘director, prescribed officer or shareholder of the company’ 
The common law Turquand rule’s protection, on the other hand, is not entirely out of an 
insider’s grasp. There are clearly circumstances in which insiders will be protected where the 
vulnerability of insiders is equal to that of outsiders. It is to be noted that, unlike s 20(7), s 
19(4)210, in its abolition of the doctrine of constructive notice, does not discriminate between 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. It follows that where a person deals with a company which is not 
an ‘Ring Fenced’ company, that person is in the same position whether he is an insider or an 
outsider neither have constructive notice of the company’s public documents. 
 
A further difference between the statutory and common law Turquand rules is that, as 
Cassim211 puts it ‘the common law Turquand rule will not protect a third party who knew or 
suspected that an internal formality or procedure had not been complied with whereas, in 
striking contrast, s 20(7)212 goes much further than this, in excluding a third party who 
‘‘reasonably ought’’ to have known of non-compliance with a formality. In explaining the 
difference, Cassim213 goes on to say ‘The test is objective. It displaces the presumption if the 
third party‘‘reasonably ought to have known’’214. This weakens the presumption that third 
parties may make regarding compliance with internal formalities and procedures. To this 
extent it is narrower than the common law rule.’ 
 
In relation to the above perceived conflicts between the Act and the common law, if it was 
intended that s 20(7) is to take precedence, one would have expected the wording of s 20(8) 
to be different or else for the Act to state expressly how the conflict is to be resolved, as it has 
done in s 5(5) and s 5(6) of the Act215. 
 
 Section 5(5) and 5(6) provide: 
 
‘(5)  If there is a conflict between a provision of Chapter 8 and a provision of 
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the Public Service Act, 1994 (Proclamation No. 103 of 1994), the provisions 
of that Act prevail.216 
 
(6)  If there is a conflict between any provision of this Act and a provision of 
the listing requirements of an exchange: 
 
(a) the provisions of both this Act and the listing requirements apply 
concurrently, to the extent that it is possible to apply and comply with one 
of the inconsistent provisions without contravening the second; and 
(b) to the extent that it is impossible to apply and comply with one of the 
inconsistent provisions without contravening the second, the provisions 
of this Act prevail, except to the extent that this Act expressly provides 
otherwise.217 
 
The issue of the precise relationship between s 20(7) and the common law Turquand rule 
raises the question of the purpose of s 20(7) and s 20(8). Did the legislature, in enacting these 
provisions, intend changing the law or was the intention merely to make awareness and 
understanding of the common-law Turquand rule more accessible to the person in the street 
who is grappling with the law? If it is the latter, it would mean that the common-law 
Turquand rule prevails in the event of a conflict. With regard to the interpretation of s 20(7) 
read with s 20(8)218, sight must also not be lost of the presumption in our law that legislation 
should be interpreted in such a way that is in accordance with the common law, or 
changes it as little as possible.219 
 
A classical statement of the operation of the presumption in respect of alterations to the 
common law is to be found in a dictum in Casserley v Stubbs220, at paragraph 312 Wessels J 
said: 
‘It is a well-known canon of construction that we cannot infer that a statue intends to alter 
the common law. The statute must either explicitly say that it is the intention of the legislature 
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to alter the common law, or the inference from the ordinance must be such that we can come 
to no other conclusion than that the legislature did have such an intention.’221 
 
Section 20(7) and s 20(8) clearly do not ‘explicitly’ alter the common law and it is submitted 
that it could hardly be said that the inference from s 20(8) is such that one can come to no 
other conclusion than that the legislature intended s 20(8) to take precedence over the 
common-law Turquand rule. With regard to the fact that s 20(7) creates a ‘presumption’ it is 
submitted that s 20(7)222 should expressly state that the presumption is irrebuttable. By doing 
so there will be no room for the argument that the company is able to rebut the presumption, 
and accordingly deprive the third person of protection, by showing that the formal or 
procedural requirement has not been complied with. The matter should be put beyond doubt 
by the legislature. It should be made clear that s 20(7) is not merely placing the onus of proof 
on the company to prove that the requirement has not been complied with, an interpretation 
that the wording of s 20(7)223 is capable of having. The common law Turquand rule clearly 
creates an irrebuttable presumption. 
 
 As Kirby P said in Registrar General v Northside Developments Pty Ltd224  at 547 held that : 
 ‘The whole point of the rule in Turquand’s case is that the presumption is irrebuttable 
conflict between s 20(4) and s 20(7)225. 
 
A question demanding clarity is whether s 20(7) trumps s 20(4). Section 20(4) provides: 
‘One or more shareholders, directors or prescribed officers of a company, or a trade union 
representing employees of the company, may apply to the High Court for an appropriate 
order to restrain the company from doing anything inconsistent with this Act226.’ 
 
What would the position be if, for example, a company enters into a contract with a third 
person in terms of which the company disposes of the greater part of its assets to the third 
party and no special resolution is obtained? Before the transfer of the assets has taken place, a 
shareholder becomes aware of the contract and applies to the High Court in terms of 
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s 20(4) of the Act for an interdict preventing the company from transferring the assets on the 
basis that the transfer is inconsistent with s 112 of the Act227, there having been no special 
resolution approving of the disposal. The third party contends that he is protected by s 20(7) 
on the basis that the special resolution requirement is a formal or procedural requirement and 
he is entitled to presume that the requirement has been complied with. Which provision is to 
prevail s 20(4) or s 20(7)? It is submitted that clarity is called for in this situation. The 
uncertainty caused by sections 20(7) and (8) is disconcerting and maybe the following 
caution in respect of ultra vires in the 1973 Act228  should have been heeded when the 
Turquand rule was addressed. 
 
Some doctrines, when they have outlived their usefulness, are easily removed others are so 
embedded in the law that force is necessary to pry them loose. A consideration of the new 
South African Companies Act suggests that the ultra vires doctrine was thought to be of the 
latter kind and that, rather than risk the use of force, the legislature has sought to render it 
harmless. This appears to be the safer approach. In fact, it is almost certainly the more 
dangerous. An error in the initial analysis of the doctrine may wreck the entire enterprise. 
Great skill is needed if the fabric of the law is in truth to remain intact. And then, even if that 
skill is achieved, the old structure is left standing and the old concepts and principles remain, 
looking for all the world as they did before, when in fact they are either redundant or, if they 
still function, do so in a radically different way.229 
 
 
4.3. The Turquand rule and the delegation of authority: 
In the case of Houghton Co v Northard, Lowe and Wills230 the articles of association of the 
company had authorised the board of directors to delegate its powers to any ordinary director. 
An ordinary director, to whom no authority had been delegated to by the board of directors, 
had entered into an unauthorised contract with the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff sought to hold the 
Defendant liable on the contract on the basis that the Turquand rule had entitled the Plaintiff 
to assume, as a matter of internal formality, that the board of directors had delegated their 
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powers to the ordinary director. The common law principle applied in this case may well 
continue to apply in practice in terms of section 20 (7) of the Act231.  
The court rejected this particular argument on the basis that the Turquand rule may have 
entitled the Plaintiff to assume that the board of directors had, as a matter of internal 
management delegated its authority but it did not, in the absence of any ostensible authority 
entitle the Plaintiff to assume that the board of directors had appointed that particular 
ordinary director as the authorised agent of the company. To apply the Turquand rule in this 
situation would be to place companies at the mercy of any agent who purports to contract on 
behalf of the company. 
This approach was followed and applied in the case of Wolpert v Uitzigt Properties (Pty) 
Ltd232  whereby on the same issue as the abovementioned case, the court stated that the 
Plaintiff may have been entitled to assume that someone had been appointed by the directors 
of the company as an authorised agent, but he cannot, by relying on the Turquand rule, 
assume that a specific person or persons has or have been appointed. In such a situation, the 
plaintiff would have to rely on ostensible authority. The issues must be resolved in 
accordance with the principles of agency law rather than being dealt with in terms of the 
Turquand rule.   
The directors’ power to enter into certain contracts may be limited or even excluded. The 
articles of association may, for example, provide that directors may not conclude particular 
contracts without the approval of the general meeting. The articles of association are regarded 
as a public document by virtue of their being registered and hence everyone dealing with the 
company is deemed to have knowledge of their contents. A third party who reads the articles 
would know that the approval of the general meeting is required, but would be uncertain 
whether it was actually obtained, because ordinary resolutions are not public documents. 
But for the Turquand rule, he would not be able to hold the company liable under the 
contract.  To limit the third party’s duty to inquire, the Turquand rule provides that if that 
party deals with the company in good faith not knowing that the necessary approval was not 
given and the circumstances are not such that he should have suspected that the approval had 
not been given, then he is entitled to assume that all internal formalities have been complied 
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with. So the company cannot argue that it is not bound to the contract because directors had 
no authority or exceeded their authority. 
 
The question is then also who can act for the company for the Turquand rule to be effective. 
There have been many opinions and uncertainty however it has been stated in the case of  
 Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Perpellief 2331978 2 SA 11 (T) 15 
and is accepted as the correct position that: 
 
”In contracting with a company the following categories of person or persons acting or 
purporting to act on its behalf may be encountered: 
(a)  The board of directors; 
(b)  The managing director or chairman of the board of directors; 
(c)  Any other person or persons such as an ordinary director or branch manager or 
secretary.” 
 
Where someone contracts with a company through the medium of the persons 
referred to above, the company will usually be bound because these persons or bodies will, 
unless the articles of association decree otherwise, be taken to have authority in one form or 
another to bind the company in all matters affecting it. Moreover all acts of internal 
management or organisation on which the exercise of such authority is dependent may, in 
terms of the Turquand rule, be assumed, by a bona fide third party, to have been properly and 
duly performed. Indeed unless some such principle was accepted no one would be safe in 
contracting with companies. 
 
 The same does not apply where the company is represented by any other person or persons 
such as an ordinary director or branch manager or secretary. Here a third party is not 
automatically entitled to assume that such person has authority and the company is not 
precluded from repudiating liability on the ground that he had no authority to bind it. To hold 
the contrary would deprive a company of the rights which any natural principal would have 
of denying the allegation that a particular person is his agent. The application of the 
Turquand rule in this sphere is limited. It only comes into operation once the third party has 
surmounted the initial hurdle not present in cases falling under the board of directors or The 
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managing director or chairman of the board of directors’ as stated above and proves that the 
director or other person purporting to represent the company had authority. Once this is 
proved then, if the actual exercise of such authority is dependent upon some act of internal 
organisation, such can, by a bona fide third party, be assumed to have been completed. But in 
dealing with the type of person in question the other contracting party cannot use the 
Turquand rule to help him surmount the hurdle mentioned.” 
 
4.4 The Turquand rule and the doctrine of constructive notice under the current regime: 
The Turquand Rule and the Doctrine of Constructive Notice are two tools that work hand-in-
hand and have been applied collectively by our courts for many years when deciding whether 
a company should be bound to a contract with a third party. This situation usually arises 
where the company will claim that they are not bound by a contract due to the fact that the 
party who contacted on the part of the company was not authorised to do so. As such, and 
according to Section 36 of the Old Act234, such a contract would be considered to be ultra 
vires as the party entering the contract did not have the authority to do. When deciding such 
an issue, a court will further apply the Doctrine of Constructive Notice and the Turquand 
Rule.235 
According to the Doctrine of Constructive Notice, a third party, when dealing with a 
company, is deemed to have knowledge of the contents of a company's public documents. As 
such, the third party, when contracting with the company, should appraise themselves with 
the contents of the Memorandum and Articles of that company in order to confirm that the 
individual representing the company in the contractual negotiations is, in fact, authorised to 
do so.236 Should that individual not be so authorised then the person would be acting beyond 
the scope of their authority, and as such the contract would be ultra vires the rules of the 
company and, as such, is not enforceable against the company. 
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The Turquand Rule, however, which rule was established in the case of Royal British Bank v 
Turquand237 , acts as a counter against the Doctrine of Constructive Notice. The Turquand 
Rule becomes applicable where the terms of the Memorandum and Articles provide for an 
internal procedure to be followed in order for an individual to have the authority to represent 
a company, for instance where a resolution needs to be passed by the company in order for 
the authority to be valid. In such instances, the Turquand Rule states that it is permissible for 
the third party contracting with the company to presume that such internal procedures have 
been complied with. Where such internal procedures have not been followed, and the person 
contracting on behalf of the company does not, in fact, have the authority to do so, such a 
contract is referred to as a limping contract and is enforceable, and capable of being 
cancelled, at the instance of the third party. 238The ability of the third party to exercise this 
right was contingent on the finding that the third party, when contracting with this individual, 
believed in good faith that the individual was properly authorised to act on behalf of the 
company. Thus, under the current regime, both the company and the third party were 
afforded protection when contracting with each other. The company was protected by the 
Doctrine of Constructive Notice, and the third party by the Turquand Rule.239 
The 2008 Act240 has changed the way in which a court will approach such an issue. Section 
36 of the 1973 Act has been retained in terms of Sections 20(1)(a) and 20(1)(b) of the New 
Act241. As such, a contract entered into by an individual on behalf of a company, where that 
individual did not have the requisite authority to enter into such a contract is considered to be 
ultra vires. The startling change, however, comes about in the modified version of the 
Doctrine of Constructive Notice242. 
According to Section 19(4) of the New Act, a third party is not deemed to have notice or 
knowledge of the contents of any documents relating to the company. As such, it is no longer 
presumed that, when contracting with a company, the third party has appraised themselves 
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with the MOI of that company. Section 19(5)243 of the New Act contains an exception to this, 
in that a third is deemed to have notice and knowledge of any provision of a company's MOI 
under section 15(2)(b) of the New Act 244  (which section deals with special conditions 
applicable to the company and requirements for the amendments thereof) if the company's 
notice of incorporation or a notice of amendment has drawn attention to the provision. It may 
therefore be seen that the 2008 Act245 abolishes the doctrine of constructive notice except in 
cases where attention is drawn to special conditions. These provisions are known as "Ring 
Fenced" provisions and in order to draw attention to such provisions they will be marked 
"RF". Therefore the doctrine of constructive notice is abolished to a certain degree. 
Further, and in terms of clause 20(7) of the New Ac246 t, the Turquand Rule has been 
legislated in a slightly modified version. In terms of this provision, "A person dealing with a 
company in good faith, other than a director, prescribed officer or shareholder of the 
company, is entitled to presume that the company, in making any decision in the exercise of 
its powers, has complied with all the formal and procedural requirements in terms of this Act, 
its memorandum of incorporation and any rules of the company unless, in the circumstances, 
the person knew or reasonably ought to have known of any failure by the company to comply 
with such requirement". 
Thus, under the new regime, the company will only enjoy the protection of the Doctrine of 
Constructive Notice in respect of Ring Fenced clauses, whereas the third party will always 
have the benefit of the Turquand Rule unless it can be demonstrated that the third party had 
knowledge, or ought to have had knowledge of the company's failure to comply with their 
internal processes.247 
As has already been mentioned, it will become mandatory for all companies to adopt a 
Memorandum of Incorporation. This exercise should not be one that is taken lightly. As can 
be seen from the exposition above, the 2008 Act248 has reduced the ability of a company to 
rely on the doctrine of constructive notice as a defence unless the company's memorandum of 
incorporation is constructed with particular provisions. Should a company blindly convert it 
memorandum and articles to a memorandum of incorporation, without carving out certain 
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provisions as ring fenced provisions, the company will effectively be depriving itself of a 
specific defence should it challenge an agreement entered into by an unauthorised individual, 
which may result in the company being bound to an onerous agreement.249 
 
4.5.The Turquand rule in relation to the concept of estoppel: 
 
It seems necessary to deal briefly with the possibility of construing s 20(8) in such a way that 
it is referring not only to the Turquand rule but also to estoppel. Is estoppel, in terms of s 
20(8), a ‘common law principle relating to the presumed validity of the actions of a 
company in the exercise of its powers’? It is submitted that s 20(8) is not referring to 
estoppel. It is true that when estoppel is successfully applied, the effect is that the action of 
the company is treated as valid, and on a first reading of s 20(8)250 one might be tempted to 
include estoppel. However, strictly speaking what happens when estoppel applies in the 
current context is that the company is prevented (estopped) from arguing that the relevant 
‘formal’ or ‘procedural’ requirement has not been met. It is prevented from raising that 
defence. Estoppel does not give rise to a presumption of validity, which is what s 20(8) is 
referring to. It will be recognised that if s 20(8) is in fact also referring to estoppel there 
is a clear conflict between the common law and s 20(7) in that s 20(7)251, unlike the common 
law, can operate to allow a contravention of statute. It has been made abundantly clear that 
the common law doctrine of estoppel does not apply to statutory requirements. 252 
 
In the case of Stand 424253 the seventh respondent (“Bubesi”) was a company in which the 
second and fourth respondents were directors. Shares in Bubesi were owned by two trusts. 
The first three respondents were the trustees in one of the trusts (the “Göbel trust”), while the 
fourth to sixth respondents were the trustees in the other (the “Deutra trust”). In January 
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2009, the second appellant, acting for the first appellant, which was then a company still to be 
formed, purchased immovable property from Bubesi. The latter was represented in the 
transaction by the second and fourth respondents, who had signed a document certifying that 
they were the directors of Bubesi, that the sale had been approved by the shareholders in a 
general meeting in terms of section 228 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, and that the 
property did not constitute the whole or greater part of the assets of the company. As it turned 
out, those statements were false, and the property was Bubesi’s sole asset. 254 
 
Shortly after the sale, various disputes arose between Bubesi and the first appellant, and, 
despite the conclusion of the agreement of sale, Bubesi let the property to a third party for a 
period of three years. The second appellant realised that Bubesi was not going to perform in 
terms of their agreement, and brought an urgent application in the High Court against Bubesi, 
for an order interdicting it from dealing with the property pending an action to be instituted 
against it. Although Bubesi opposed the application, relying, inter alia, on the fact that 
section 228 had not been complied with, the court granted the order sought.255 
 
Apart from the second and fourth respondents, the trustees of the shareholding trusts claimed 
not to have been aware of the sale, or the order sought, until after it was granted. The trustees 
and Bubesi thus brought an urgent application seeking a declaratory order setting aside the 
order obtained by the second appellant, and an order that there had been non - compliance 
with section 228 and that the sale was thus unenforceable. 256 
 
The orders sought were granted, but leave was granted to appeal to the present Court. 
The issue on appeal was whether section 228 of the Companies Act is qualified by the 
application of either the Turquand rule or estoppel.257 
 
Section 228258 provides that the directors of a company may not dispose of the whole or the 
greater part of its assets without the approval, by special resolution, of the shareholders. 
The Turquand rule in essence, is that a person dealing with a company in good faith is 
entitled to assume that the company has complied with its internal procedures and formalities. 










 See note 1 and note 2 
43 
 
The Court was satisfied that the clear meaning of section 228 is that the shareholders must 
give their consent to, or ratify, the disposal of the sole asset, or the major assets, of a 
company. If the purpose of section 228 is the protection of the shareholders, then the 
application of the Turquand rule would deprive them of that protection. The section would 
then serve no purpose. The requirement that the shareholders’ approval be obtained by way 
of special reaolution was introduced in terms of an amendment to section 228 in 2006. The 
Court held that the requirement of a special resolution does not change the principle as to the 
non- applicability of the Turquand rule to section 228.259 
 
The argument based on estoppel was intended to advance the contention that the appellants’ 
had relied on the document signed by the second and fourth respondents, certifying that the 
disposal of the asset had been properly approved. However, as the representation had not 
been made by the shareholders in question, the reliance on estoppel was abandoned. In any 
event, as pointed out by the Court, estoppel cannot operate to allow a contravention of a 
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CHAPTER 5:  
5. Representation by the directors of a company: 
5.1. Representation and the authority of the directors: 
A company acts through the medium of its directors’ and officers’. The principles of agency 
law are of particular importance to corporate law. Section 66 (1) of the Act261 states that the 
business affairs of a company must be managed by or under the direction of its board which 
has the authority to exercise all the powers and perform any of the functions of the company, 
except to the extent that the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation and the Act 
provides.262  
The board of directors is likely to delegate its powers to manage the business of a company to 
individual directors and officers of the company. If such persons enter into contracts on 
behalf of the company, whether or not the company will be bound, by such contracts, 
depends on the principles of agency law, which require such individuals to have authority to 
contract on behalf of the company. Authority is a concept of agency law.263 
According to the law of agency, if an agent contracts with a third party on behalf of the 
company, the contract will bind the third party and the company, known as the principal as if 
the company had concluded the contract personally. The agent is merely regarded as an 
intermediary. The agent acquires no rights nor will the agent incur any liabilities under the 
contract unless the contrary is agreed to between the parties. Once the contract with the third 
party is concluded, the agent falls away.  An agent who contracts with a third party without 
any authority will not only fail to bind the principal to the contract but the agent will also 
incur liability to compensate a third party who suffers loss or any prejudice thereof for breach 
of warranty of authority or misrepresentation264.  
The same principles as discussed supra also apply to a director who contracts on behalf of a 
company. In order for a director or an agent to act on behalf of a company, they must have 
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the necessary authority to do so. Such authority may be actual authority, usual authority or 
ostensible authority.265 
5.2. Actual authority: 
Actual authority consists of express authority and implied authority. Express authority refers 
to authority given in so many words, either orally or in writing. Where express authority is 
subject to compliance with some internal formality, the common law, the Turquand rule and 
section 20 (7) of the Act266, entitle a bona fide party to assume that this formality has been 
complied with unless he or she knew or ought to have reasonably known that it has not been 
so. Implied authority is authority given in not so many words, but which arises as a result of a 
reasonable inference from the conduct of the principal. 267 
In the case of Freeman and Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd268 it was held 
by the learned presiding officer, Diplock LJ that actual authority is a relationship between 
principal and agent created by a consensual agreement to which they alone are parties… 
Nevertheless, if the agent does enter into a contract pursuant to the “actual” authority, it does 
create contractual rights and liabilities between the principal and the contractor. 269 
In the case of Hopkins v Dallas Group Ltd270 the court held that “the authority of an agent is 
actual where it results from a manifestation of consent that he should represent or act for the 
principal expressly or impliedly made by the principal  to the agent himself”. The court went 
on to further state that the grant of the actual authority should be implied as being subject to a 
condition that it is to be exercised honestly and on behalf of the principal. An agent is not 
authorised to act contrary to the interests of the principal.271 
 If the agent has express authority, or if the company is estopped from claiming lack of 
authority, the company is bound. However, a problematic situation may arise in that the 
company can have the standard articles but a provision is added that if the contract value is 
above 50% of the issued share capital of the company, prior authority from the general 
meeting is required but no contracts can be concluded under any circumstances above 100% 
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of the issued share capital. The agents therefore have potential authority for the 50% issued 
share capital contract but no authority for the 100% share capital contract. If they now 
purport to conclude the latter, the company will not be bound because it was ultra vires the 
authority and the third party is deemed to have knowledge due to the doctrine of constructive 
notice. Estoppel can also not work, as the same doctrine precludes a misrepresentation by the 
company of something that the third party is deemed to know is not true.272 
 
5.3. Ostensible authority: 
Ostensible authority is sometimes also referred to as apparent authority or agency by 
estoppel. Ostensible authority arises where a person has by his or her words or conduct, 
created the impression that someone is his or her duly authorised agent thereby inducing an 
innocent third party to deal with the agent in that capacity. The agent’s ostensible authority is 
as a result of the principal’s statement or conduct but not necessarily via the consent of the 
principal. 273 In other words ostensible authority arises where a principal has made a 
representation, whether by words or conduct to a third party that the agent has the requisite 
authority to act on his or her behalf. If the third party has reasonably relied on this 
representation, the principal would be estopped or prevented from denying the authority of 
the agent. The representation however must be made by the principal and not only by the 
agent.274 
According to Freeman’s 275  case, the following three requirements must be satisfied for 
ostensible authority: 
 a representation must have been made to a third party that the agent has the authority 
to enter into a contract;276 
 such representation must be made a person who has actual authority to manage the 
company’s business either generally or in respect of matters to which the contract 
relates to. A third party cannot rely on an agent’s own representation that he or she 
has the required authority. The agent would also represent that he or she has 
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authority but it is not the agent’s representation that gives rise to ostensible 
authority.277 
 The third party must have been induced by the representation to enter into the 
contract. In other words, the third party must have relied on such representation.278279 
If a third party dealing with an agent knows that the agent does not have actual authority 
to conclude the particular contract, the third party cannot rely on ostensible authority. If 
the third party knows or ha reason to know that the contract is contrary to commercial 
interests of the principal, it will be difficult for the third party to assert with any 
credibility that he or she believed that the agent had actual authority.280281 
In the case of NBS Bank Ltd v Cape Produce Co (Pty) Ltd282 the court, in approving of 
Freeman’s case laid down six requirements for ostensible authority as discussed below: 
 A representation whether by words or conduct; 
 Made by the principal or someone with actual authority; 
 In a form such that the principal should reasonably have expected that outsiders 
would act on the strength of the representation; 
 Reliance by the third party; 
 Such reliance must be reasonable; 
 There must be consequent prejudice to the third party.283284 
According to a third party perspective, it would not make a difference as to whether the agent 
has actual or ostensible authority because ultimately, the principal will be bound to the third 
party. It makes a vital difference however, between the principal and the agent. Since 
ostensible authority is no authority at all, the agent will be liable to the principal for any 
breach of fiduciary duty not to exceed his authority. If in the circumstance that the principal 
is not bound to the third party at all, the third party may have a delictual action against the 
director or agent based on misrepresentation or an action for breach of warranty of authority. 
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In the latter event, the director agent is not liable in terms of the contract. The measure of 
damages is that the agent must put the third party in the same position as if the principal had 
been bound by the contract.285 
5.4. Usual authority: 
Usual authority may form part of implied authority or it may be restricted to usual authority. 
In the latter instance, the principal appoints an agent to an office or a position that carries 
with it authority to contract on behalf of the principal but the principal has restricted this 
usual authority. The importance of usual authority in company law arises from the fact that 
the position or office occupied by a company officer who is an employee of the company 
may determine the extent of his or her authority. In other words, the authority of the agent 
may flow from the office held by the particular company officer in question. The 
appointment of a person may carry with it the implied usual authority to do whatever falls 
within the usual scope of that office.  
In the Hopkins286 case the court stated that where a board of directors’ appoint one of their 
members to an executive position, they implicitly authorise that person to do all such things 
that fall within the usual scope of that office.  
Thus, in the case of Hely – Hurchinson287 the chairman of the company also acted as the de 
facto managing director of the company without having ever been asked to do so or formally 
appointed as such. The chairman entered into an agreement on behalf of the company under 
which he committed the company to giving a guarantee and an indemnity in respect of certain 
transactions. The board of directors subsequently refused to honour those undertakings on the 
ground that the chairman had no authority to act on behalf of the company. The court herein 
decided that as chairman of the board of directors, the chairman had no implied usual 
authority to enter into the agreements but he did have such authority in his capacity as a de 
facto managing director by his conduct and the acceptance of the board in that respect.288 
In the case of SA Securities Ltd v Nicholas289 the court stated that the mere fact of appointing 
a person as a managing director, gives him certain implied powers. Anyone dealing in good 
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faith with the managing director is entitled to assume that the managing director has all the 
powers which his or her position as such would ostensibly give him or her. 290 
In the case of Panorama Developments Ltd v Fidelis Furnishing Fabrics Ltd291 Lord Denning 
held that a company’s secretary is an officer of the company with extensive duties and 
responsibilities. A secretary is entitled to sign contracts connected with the administrative 
side of the company. 292 
Where a company officer acts within a certain scope of their usual authority, the company 
may in certain circumstances still be bound by their acts even though the company may have 
restricted the scope of their usual authority. Such restricted usual authority does not form a 
part of implied authority. The basis of liability in such cases would consequently be 
ostensible authority provided that the prerequisites for such authority are satisfied.293 
 
5.5. Ratification: 
Ratification refers to a retrospective authorisation or conferral of authority by the principal or 
the company. In effect, the company or principal forgives the agent and adopts the 
unauthorised contract usually with retrospective effect. If ratified, the contract becomes fully 
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It is submitted that the protection of parties dealing with a company in circumstances where 
an internal irregularity in relation to the company has occurred, is an area of great 
complexity. Drafting legislation in this regard is no easy task as is indicated in the discussion 
in this note of relevant provisions of the Act. The large body of jurisprudence that has built 
up over the years dealing with this area of the law is testimony to its intricacy. It is 
submitted that the discussion in this study indicates the need for the legislature to re-visit the 
relevant provisions of the Act and either repeal them or amend them so as to provide the 
clarity that is called for. The optimum approach would be, it is submitted, to repeal s 20(7)295 
and (8)296 altogether, leaving the common law and the development thereof to deal with the 
matter.297 
 
The Turquand rule mitigates the unrealistic doctrine of constructive notice which deems 
anyone dealing with a company to know the contents of the company’s memorandum, 
articles of association, resolutions and other documents recorded on the company’s file with 
the Registrar of Companies. In its simplest form the Turquand rule, or indoor management 
rule, entails that if nothing has occurred which is obviously contrary to the provisions of the 
registered documents of the company, an outsider may assume that all the internal matters of 
the company are regular. It is unfortunate that a detailed and carefully articulated explanatory 
memorandum did not accompany the Bill preceding the Act. The attention that such an 
exercise would have demanded would no doubt have thrown up the kind of difficulties one 
has in interpreting, understanding and applying provisions of the Act such as s 19(4) and 
(5)298 and s 20(7) and (8)299.  
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Finally, if the provisions of s 20(7) read with s 20(8)300 do have the effect that a person 
acquiring the whole or the greater part of the assets of a company may assume that the 
statutory special resolution requirement has been complied with, and the court in Stand 242 
was aware of the provisions of the 2008 Act301, the conclusion that one must come to is that 
the court in Stand 242302 disagreed with the view taken by the legislature. The Act and the 
Bill on which the Act303 is based were in the public domain long before the judgement in 
Stand 242 304was handed down, so it is likely that the court in Stand 242305 was aware of the 
stance taken by the drafters of the Act. Be that as it may, the court a quo and the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in Stand 242306 (all judges concurring) and the court in Farren’s307 case all 
agreed that the protection of shareholders should trump the protection of the third party 
dealing with the company that the legislature has taken the opposite view. 
 
This result, however, is not a foregone conclusion. It is imperative for the company to invest 
time, effort and expertise into this exercise, and not view it as a routine administrative 
process. Should it adopt this stance there is no reason why the company should not enjoy just 
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